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Acting within the agency theory theoretical framework, the paper 
focuses on the role of the corporate governance as a system to 
monitor and predict the fraud occurrence and magnitude. 
Specifically, the study examines the impact of the quality of the 
corporate governance of the firms, for which a fraud was detected, 
on the fraud occurrence and magnitude. We posit that fraudulent 
behaviours, by those who can take advantage of information 
asymmetry and gain personal benefits from them, can occur when 
strong agency problems emerge and a weak governance exists. 
Thus, the financial statement fraud can be seen as the result of high 
agency problems and high conflicts of interests not solved by the 
company. Starting from a sample of 101 listed companies, for 
which a fraud was detected, using a principal component analysis, 
we develop a corporate governance index, which measures the 
quality of the governance system of the firms. To test the 
hypothesis, we run a multinomial logistic regression on a cross-
sectional analysis, controlling the results with a matched sample of 
firms that did not experienced any fraud. Empirical evidences seem 
to confirm the existence of a negative relationship between the 
quality of the corporate governance system of a firm and both the 
financial statement fraud occurrence and magnitude, indicating the 
governance system of the firm as a fraud deterrent for any amount 
of financial statement fraud. These findings are even stronger for 
firms characterized by the presence of a blockholder. 
This study contributes to the governance literature by focusing on 
the corporate governance quality and its impact on financial 
statement frauds. Moreover, the analysis suggests that a good level 
of governance can help companies to mitigate the agency problems 
and to detect fraudulent behaviours, thus our empirical evidence 
can guide regulators in developing regulations to avoid the fraud 
occurrence. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Fraud, Agency Theory 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An increasing number of financial statement frauds 
have been detected over the last decades. Aiming to 
find some ways to prevent frauds, researchers have 
started to analyse the factors that are related to 
them to implement preventive actions and 
mechanisms to avoid, or at least reduce, the 
possibility of the fraud occurrence (Albrecht, 
Albrecht, and Dolan, 2007; Hemraj, 2004; Lev, 2003; 
Rezaee, 2002). Specifically, a large part of the 
international literature has begun to focus the 
attention towards the relationship between some 
mechanisms of corporate governance and the fraud 
manifestation (Caplan, 1999; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Lapides, 2000; Young, 2002). The 
interest is addressed towards the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in solving governance 
problems and exercising a control function over the 
different actors of the firm (Dey, 2008). Numerous 
scholars have investigated on this relation. For 
instance, Loebbecke, Eming, and Willingham (1989) 
point out the importance of the audit committee 
and board governance mechanisms in decreasing 
the likelihood of financial statement frauds. Later, 
Beasley (1996) analyses the relationship between 
financial frauds and the board composition, finding 
higher percentages of outside directors in no-fraud 
firms, compared to fraud ones. Similarly, Uzun, 
Szewczyk, and Varma, (2004) suggest that the board 
composition and the structure of a board’s oversight 
committee are related with the fraud occurrence. 
Coherently with this perspective, Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) find, in different 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 14, Issue 3, Spring 2017, Continued - 2 
272  
industries, a positive relation between the 
differences in the adopted corporate governance 
mechanisms and frauds committed. Furthermore, 
many other studies analyse the fraud occurrence in 
relation with some mechanisms of corporate 
governance: Faber (2005) studies the fraud in 
relation with some characteristics of the board and 
the audit committee; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 
(1996) in relation with the board features; Erickson, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) and also Ndofor, Wesley 
and Priem (2015) in relation with the executive 
compensation system.  
Even though many corporate governance 
mechanisms have been investigated to understand 
their relation with financial statement frauds, to our 
knowledge, no empirical studies considered the 
whole set of corporate governance mechanisms in 
relation with this aspect. Starting from this gap, the 
base line of this paper is the relationship between 
financial statement frauds and corporate 
governance as a combination of mechanisms aiming 
at reducing agency conflicts. This relation is 
analysed within the agency theory theoretical 
framework (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989; Demsky, 
2003). To study the conflicts of interests arising 
among different actors of the firms, we focus on 
both the insider and the outsider corporate 
governance systems, typical of different capitalism 
features, in order to analyse if cross-cultural 
differences exist with respct to financial statement 
frauds. Specifically, we argue that strong agency 
problems, even worsened by a weak corporate 
governance, end up in fraudulent behaviours 
implemented by those actors who can take 
advantage of information asymmetry and gain 
personal benefits from them. Thus, the financial 
statement fraud can be explained as the result of 
high agency problems and high conflicts of interests 
not solved by the company. 
To investigate on this statement, an empirical 
analysis has been conducted. Firstly, we evaluate the 
corporate governance of 101 firms, for which a 
fraud has been detected, building a Corporate 
Governance Index (CGI), which measures the quality 
of the corporate governance. This is consistent with 
previous studies conducted by other scholars 
(Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006; Bauer, Gunster, and Otten, 2004; 
Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Renders, 
Gaeremynck, A., and Sercu, 2010), who developed 
some Corporate Governance Indexes to test their 
impact on firm’s performance. Secondly, we test the 
relation between the quality of the governance and 
both the occurrence and the magnitude of the fraud, 
using a multinomial logistic regression on a cross-
sectional analysis and controlling the results with a 
matched sample of firms that did not experienced 
any fraud. 
The research aims to test a negative relation 
between the quality of the corporate governance and 
the fraud (measured by both its occurrence and 
magnitude), in order to confirm whether a strong 
level of corporate governance system might help at 
mitigating the agency problems and at avoiding 
fraudulent behaviours. 
This study contributes to the literature and to 
the managerial community in two different ways. 
First of all, it provides a deeper analysis of the 
corporate governance as a system in relation with 
frauds, filling the gap of the literature on this topic. 
Secondly, rather than investigating on the 
importance of single elements of corporate 
governance, the empirical analysis highlights the 
vision of the corporate governance as a combination 
of elements useful to discourage frauds and 
mitigate their impact. This perspective can help 
both managers and practitioners to focus their 
attention not on single aspects of the governance, 
but on the whole system, understanding how the 
interactions among the various mechanisms could 
be used to prevent and avoid fraudulent behaviours. 
To reach these aims, the paper is organized as 
follows: first we provide a deep review of the 
literature about corporate governance and financial 
statement frauds, proposing the hypothesis within 
the developed theoretical framework; then we 
specify the constructs used in the empirical 
analysis, constructing a Corporate Governance Index 
(CGI). Later, we present the data, the variables and 
the econometric model used to test the hypothesis. 
Finally, in the last section, we conduct the analysis, 
doing also the robustness checks, and present our 
results, conclusions, practical implications, and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Corporate Governance and Financial Statement 
Frauds 
 
The separation between ownership and management 
is a typical evidence of those companies 
characterized by a dispersed ownership (Berle and 
Means, 1932). The agency theory suggests that the 
separation between ownership and management in 
the company leads to a misalignment of interests 
between shareholders (the principal) and the 
management (the agent) because the formers aim to 
maximize the share value and create value for the 
company, while the latter’s main goal is to reinforce 
its position and power within the firm, increasing 
also its remuneration and personal benefits, at the 
expenses of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Seal, 2006). As Means (1931) points out, where 
ownership is sufficiently sub-divided, the 
management can become a self-perpetuating body 
even though its share in the ownership is negligible. 
Therefore, the agency relationship between owners 
and managers is characterized by conflicts of 
interests and information asymmetry, peculiar 
characteristics of the Anglo-American countries, 
where firms are more market-oriented (Ricketts, 
1987).  
If the conflict of interests is not controlled, the 
self-interested behaviour of the manager can take 
place through activities or decisions aiming to 
favour personal interests, such as the consumption 
of firm’s resources and assets, the avoidance of 
risky investments and, in the worst case, the 
manipulation of financial statement figures. This 
result can be worsened by the absence of any 
control activity operated by the shareholders, who 
have just little incentives to monitor managers due 
to the small portion of shares individually detained. 
Recently, it has also been demonstrated that in case 
there is a high complexity-based information 
asymmetry the likelihood of fraud occurrence due 
to the self-interested behaviour of the manager is 
even higher (Ndofor, Wesley, and Priem, 2015). 
Therefore, the owners have interest to set up some 
mechanisms to control managerial actions and 
bound bad managerial behaviours (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Along this perspective, 
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international literature suggests that the corporate 
governance structure should help at mitigating the 
agency conflicts (Dey, 2008).  
Considering the different types of agency 
problems arising worldwide, we follow the 
contribute of Hanson and Song (2006), who define 
corporate governance as a bundle of internal and 
external mechanisms, aiming at reducing the 
interests’ misalignments among the firm and the 
different stakeholders who have relationships with 
the firm itself.  
The typical “principal-agent” problem is not 
the only type of conflict of interests that can arise 
within a firm. In fact, a large part of the literature 
has focused the attention also on the “principal-
principal” agency conflict (Dharwadkar, George, and 
Brandes, 2000; Young, 2008; Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2012), which occurs in firms 
characterized by the presence of a large 
blockholder, more common in non-Anglo-American 
countries. In this context, the larger shareholders 
can abuse of their majority position to gain private 
benefits at the expenses of the minority 
shareholders. Even in this case, the corporate 
governance structure can help at mitigating the 
conflict of interests between majority and minority 
shareholders through some mechanisms that bundle 
the control and behaviour of the former, avoiding 
the diverting of company resources and cash flow 
(Love, 2000). 
Moving from the agency theory framework and 
the conflict of interests’ between both managers and 
owners and principals and principals, some authors 
address the main cause of fraudulent financial 
reports to the intent of the managers in maintaining 
their position and their power inside the company 
(Johnson, Ryan, and Tian, 2009; Robinson and 
Sartore, 2011). This leads to a continuous cheating 
on the financial documents to maintain the 
appearance of high profits and value of the firm. 
Despite the type of corporate governance 
adopted by the firms, worldwide anecdotal 
evidences show that the phenomenon of financial 
statement frauds is strictly related to the lack or the 
inefficiency of the governance system itself. Thus, 
along this path of research, past literature has seen 
in the corporate governance, and specifically in its 
mechanisms, the tool to solve the agency problems 
and their consequences (Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the chance of 
implementing a financial statement fraud can be 
related to the ineffectiveness and to the lack of 
responsibility of the corporate governance system of 
the firm, which creates an environment that 
increases the opportunity to engage in manipulation 
actions (Rezaee, 2002). Therefore, when a fraud 
occurs, serious concerns raise about the role of the 
governance bodies (the board, the audit committee, 
the top management team, the internal auditors, 
and the external auditors) because the responsibility 
of detecting and preventing frauds is usually 
attributed - at a first glimpse - to them. Moreover, a 
recent study shows how the external mechanisms 
for control, such as external pressure from activist 
owners, the market for corporate control, and 
securities analysts, usually considered as fraud 
deterrent, do increase managers’ likelihood of 
financial fraud (Shy, Connelly, and Hoskisson, 2016). 
Thus, it seem relevant to focus more on the internal 
control mechanisms of corporate governance.  
Given that considerations, In our opinion, the 
governance mechanisms forming the governance 
system of the firm should be analysed all at the 
same time in order to provide an overview of all the 
governance aspects of the company and to highlight 
the role of corporate governance on frauds. 
Furthermore, the literature focusing on the relation 
between corporate governance and frauds, as we 
have seen, usually takes into account only a limited 
sample of the different corporate governance 
mechanisms per time. Actually, each mechanism if 
considered individually could be unrelated to the 
fraud, but, together with others, it could have an 
impact on the fraud occurrence and/or on its 
magnitude. 
All these considerations suggest that the 
corporate governance, viewed as the synthesis of all 
its mechanisms, has a role on the financial 
statement fraud, and lead to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The lower the corporate governance 
quality of a firm, the higher the financial statement 
fraud occurrence and level. 
Considering the function that corporate 
governance should have on solving the agency 
problems, (Dey, 2008), we posit that a ‘good’ level of 
governance leads to better behaviours of those 
actors who could take advantage of the information 
asymmetry and gain personal benefits at the 
expenditure of those who have no direct control and 
management power on the firm. Moreover, at the 
same time, we also posit that the level of the fraud 
will be higher when the governance system of the 
firm is weak.  
 
2.2. The Corporate Governance Variables 
 
Over the last decades, a part of the literature has 
started to study the impact of the corporate 
governance on different firm’s related aspects, 
measuring it through indexes. Among the first 
authors who studied the corporate governance level 
of a firm, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
analysed the role of good governance practices on 
the firm’s value, building a CGI based on 24 rules 
and finding that firms with higher governance 
scores reported a higher firm value. Later, Larker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007) and Klapper and Love 
(2004) analysed how the governance is related with 
the operating performance in firms belonging to 
emerging markets. On this aspect, many other 
country-based studies have been developed over the 
last years (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006; Black, Love, 
and Rachinsky, 2006; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; 
Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012). 
Following this path of research, this work 
focuses on the role of the corporate governance 
system as a combination of mechanisms on 
financial fraud occurrence and fraud magnitude. In 
other words, considering that taking into account a 
single governance mechanism per time could lead to 
incorrect or distorted conclusions, we call for the 
building of a CGI, able to summarize all corporate 
governance variables relying on the traditional 
governance mechanisms considered by literature. 
The CGI we propose takes into account the 
governance mechanisms mentioned by previous 
studies on frauds: the board of directors (features 
and rules), the CEO and Executives characteristics, 
the compensation system for top management, the 
audit committee and the external auditors taking 
into account that the ownership structure in this 
study is not considered as a governance mechanism, 
but a variable that determines the type of corporate 
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governance system adopted by the firm. For each 
corporate governance mechanism, the most 
common corporate governance variables were taken 
into account, considering the features and aspects 
particularly relevant for the literature in analysing 
their relation with frauds (see Table 1).  
The bundle of these indicators constitutes our 
set of individual corporate governance variables. 
Nevertheless, from a statistical point of view, the 
high number of variables would generate a model 
with too many potentially insignificant outcomes, 
distorting the findings of a link between certain 
“core” mechanisms and the fraud. This error in the 
estimation of the mechanisms’ impact on frauds 
would happen due to the correlation among the 
single variables, obtaining spurious inferences 
(Agraval and Knoeber, 1996; Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
Venkatachalam, 2008; Dey, 2008). The creation of an 
index can solve this problem. In pursuing this aim, 
and following Brown and Caylor’s (2006) approach, 
as a first step, the identified corporate governance 
variables have been classified into binary records, as 
1 if the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) or 
the literature consider the firm’s governance 
variable minimally acceptable, 0 if not. We 
determine if a firm’s governance variable is 
minimally acceptable using the information 
provided by the “ISS Corporate Governance: Best 
Practice User Guide and Glossary” (2003) and by 
previous literature. 
 
Table 1. Principal component analysis variables 
 
Variable Definition Value 
BODSIZE 
Small size: boards are more efficient when their size is small (Lipton 
and Lorsh, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). The optimal number 
according to literature is 8 or 9. The ISS state that the number of 
Board members should not exceed 15. 
The variable is coded as 1 if the number 
of Board Members is less or equal to 8, 
consistently with the empirical evidence 
showed in the studies of Agraval and 
Chada (2005) 
BODIND 
The independent directors are believed to be better able in 
monitoring managers and CEO (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 
1988). The ISS state that more than half of the Board should be 
composed by independent directors. 
The variable is coded as 1 if more than 
half of the Board is composed by 
independent directors 
BODMEET 
High number of Board meetings per year: the more they meet in one 
year the more they will be conscious of the company situation and 
reality, having the change to better decide on the firm’s actions to 
be implemented (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). 
The variable is coded as 1 if the number 
of Board meeting in a year exceeds 6. 
BODAGE 
Young and not busy directors: old and busy directors are less 
efficient in the monitoring function (Core et al., 1999; Ferris et al., 
2003). 
The variable is coded as one if the 
average age of the Board members is 
lower than 55 years old 
CHAIRTENURE 
Not very long chairman tenure: a long staying in the same company 
can lead these top management figure to behave and act like the 
owners of the company (Loebbecke et al., 1989; Johnson et al., 
2009).  
The variable is coded as 1 if the 
Chiarman tenure is less than 5 years 
BUSYDIR 
No busy Directors: The ISS state that a director should not seats in 
more than 5 additional Boards.  
The variable is coded as 1 if a director 
serves also in other Boards, 0 if the 
director serves only in the Board of the 
company 
ETHIC 
The presence of a Code of Ethic is seen as a sign of good governance 
(Lo, 2008) 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the 
company has a Code of Ethic, 0 otherwise 
AUDIND 
Independence: the independence of the Audit Committee can assure 
a better and fair control over the management operations (Uzun et 
al., 2004). 
The variable is coded as 1 if the majority 
of the Audit Committee is composed by 
independent directors 
NOMIND 
Independence: the ISS state that the Nomination Committee should 
be composed only by independent directors 
The variable is coded as 1 if the majority 
of the Nomination Committee is 
composed by independent directors 
COMPIND 
Independence: the ISS state that the Compensation Committee 
should be composed only by independent directors 
The variable is coded as 1 if the majority 
of the Compensation Committee is 
composed by independent directors 
AUDFINEXP 
Presence of a financial expertise: this allows discovering more easily 
eventual mistakes and misreporting in the financial statement 
(Agraval and Knoeber, 1996; Agraval and Chadha, 2005).  
The variable is coded as 1 if in the Audit 
Committee is present a financial expert 
CEODUAL 
No CEO duality: the main part of the literature agrees on the fact 
that if there is no CEO duality the independence of the board is 
preserved (Yermack, 1996; Sharma, 2004). The ISS state that the 
CEO and the Chairman duties should be separated. 
The variable is coded as 1 if there is no 
CEO duality 
CEOTENURE 
Not very long CEO tenure: an established CEO is believed to have 
more power on the Board and can influence easily its decisions than 
a new CEO; this power becomes stronger when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the Board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
The variable is coded as 1 if the CEO 
tenure is less than 5 years 
CEOSO 
Low level of stock options: the equity-based compensation has the 
consequence of creating the incentive to commit managerial fraud 
(Bruner, McKee and Sartore, 2008) 
The variable is coded as 1 if the ratio 
between the value of the Stock Option 
granted and the total annual 
compensation is lower than 30% 
LEVCOMP 
Low level of option incentives: the literature considers the option 
incentives’ intensity positively correlated with the bad behaviour 
and performance of the managers (Erickson et al., 2006).  
The variable is coded as 1 if the 
compensation leverage is lower or equal 
to 1 
BIG5 
Good reputation: it is seen as warranty for the audit quality (Agraval 
and Chadha, 2005). 
The variable is coded as 1 if the external 
auditor of the firm is one of the BIG5 
(KPMG, Ernst & Young, PriceWaterhouseC
oopers, Deloitte & Touche and Arthur 
Andersen) 
NONAUDITTOTALE 
Independence: the external auditors’ duty is to enhance the 
credibility of the financial statement of the firm so their 
independence from the firm is a fundamental requirement (Frankel, 
Johnson and Nelson, 2002). The ISS state that the consulting fees to 
the external auditors should not be no more that the audit fees paid 
to it. 
The variable is coded as 1 if the ratio 
between Non Audit Fees and the Total 
Fees paid to the external auditor is lower 
than 50% 
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2.3. The Corporate Governance Index 
 
Following the approach adopted by Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2007), the exploratory 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to 
identify the underlying dimensions of corporate 
governance and determine which indicators are 
associated with each factor. The PCA analysis, being 
a statistical procedure that uses an orthogonal 
transformation to convert a set of observations of 
possibly correlated variables into a set of values of 
linearly uncorrelated variables called principal 
components, leads to a smaller number of artificial 
variables that account for most of the variance in 
the observed variables. In our dataset, each of these 
components represents a dimension of the 
corporate governance that includes all highly-
correlated variables. 
According to the Kaiser rule, we dropped all 
components with eigenvalues under 1.0 – this being 
the eigenvalue equal to the information accounted 
for by an average single item. Consequently, we 
retain all components with an eigenvalue greater 
than 1.0, obtaining 6 factors that explain the 62,05% 
of the total variance in the original dataset (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2. Principal component analysis matrix 
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.77087 .818109 0.1732 0.1732 
Comp2 1.95276 .518732 0.1220 0.2952 
Comp3 1.43403 .0828737 0.0896 0.3849 
Comp4 1.35115 .0511455 0.0844 0.4693 
Comp5 1.30001 .181466 0.0813 0.5506 
Comp6 1.11854 .124437 0.0699 0.6205 
Comp7 .994104 .159305 0.0621 0.6826 
Comp8 .834799 .0832703 0.0522 0.7348 
Comp9 .751528 .0496787 0.0470 0.7817 
Comp10 .70185 .0264415 0.0439 0.8256 
Comp11 .675408 .0766171 0.0422 0.8678 
Comp12 .598791 .100663 0.0374 0.9052 
Comp13 .498128 .0424789 0.0311 0.9364 
Comp14 .455649 .0452333 0.0285 0.9649 
Comp15 .410416 .258441 0.0257 0.9905 
Comp16 .151975 . 0.0095 1.0000 
Note: Principal components/correlation: Number of Obs = 202; Number of comp. =16; Trace = 16;   
Rotation: (unrotated = principal): Rho = 1.0000 
 
Then these factors have been rotated using a 
varimax rotation that allows the retained factors to 
be correlated to enhance interpretability of the PCA 
solution. The 6 factors identified represent the 
underlying dimensions of corporate governance for 
our selected variables. 
To determine which variables are the most 
relevant for each factor, we focus on the 
eigenvectors  of  the  variables  for  each  component:  
the higher the eigenvector, the more the variable 
explains the factor itself. We associate each factor 
with those variables that have a loading that exceeds 
0.40 in absolute value and are statistically different 
from zero at conventional levels. Each governance 
variable has been used as being able to explain a 
single factor. In other terms, each variable is 
selected as a determinant for the dimension in 
which it presents the highest eigenvector (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Principal component analysis - rotate components 
 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Unexplained 
CEODUAL 
  
-0.4703 
   
.5003 
BODMEET 
   
0.6445 
  
.311 
ETHIC 0.4312 
     
.4759 
AUDIND 0.4973 
     
.4008 
NOMIND 0.5429 
     
.3333 
COMPIND 0.4884 
     
.3456 
BODSIZE 
    
0.6587 
 
.3633 
BODAGE 
    
0.5488 
 
.4785 
BODIND 0.4102 
     
.6846 
AUDFINEXP 
  
0.6113 
   
.3535 
CHAIRTENURE 
 
0.6708 
    
.128 
CEOTENURE 
 
0.6790 
    
.1194 
BUSYDIR 
  
-0.4320 
   
.4724 
BIG5 
     
0.7040 .331 
NONAUDITOTALE 
     
0.5886 .4328 
LEVCOMP 
   
0.6571 
  
.3422 
 
Considering that each dimension captures 
some governance aspects, the identified factors have 
been labelled according to the variables contained in 
each one (Table 4). 
Once the corporate governance dimensions are 
obtained, the Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is 
calculated to capture all the aspect of the firm 
related to the corporate governance. The main 
problem in the construction of the CGI relies on the 
absence of a well-developed theoretical work on the 
multi-dimensional construct of corporate 
governance. In our opinion, focusing on a single 
governance factor, as representative of corporate 
governance, appears to be reductive and, moreover, 
leads to errors in the measurement due to the 
regression coefficient, which will be inconsistent 
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(Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007). At the same 
time, simply adding together a set of indicators is 
still a limit due to the statistical and econometric 
problems that can occur in this case. 
 
Table 4. Corporate governance dimensions 
 
Dimension 
- independent 
variable - 
Dimension name 
- CG Aspect - 
Dimension Components 
- CG variables 
determinants - 
DIM 1 
Board 
Independence 
ETHIC; AUDIND; 
NOMIND; COMPIND; 
BODIND 
DIM 2 
Top Management 
Tenure 
CHAIRTENURE; 
CEOTENURE 
DIM 3 
Board Members' 
Job Characteristics 
CEODUAL; AUDFINEXP; 
BUSYDIR 
DIM 4 Board Decisions BODMEET; LEVCOMP 
DIM 5 Board Features BODSIZE; AVAGEDIR 
DIM 6 External Auditor BIG5; NONAUDITTOTALE 
 
Previous studies built indexes to measure the 
overall corporate governance through different 
methodologies. For instance, Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) created a ‘G-Index’ summing 24 
binary governance variables. Thus, the index can 
assume a value comprises between 0 and 24. 
Similarly, Brown and Caylor (2006) built their 
corporate governance index – ‘Gov-Score’ - as the 
sum of 51 binary governance items, where each of 
them is equal to 1 if it represents acceptable 
governance, 0 otherwise. Finally, Bebchuk and Cohen 
(2005) constructed a governance index, called 
Entrenchment Index, which relies on the ‘G-Index’ by 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), varying in the 
choice of the provisions included in it, but giving the 
same weight to each provision. 
In this paper we propose a novel approach to 
calculate the CGI, building on previous studies. First, 
we proceed with the classification into binary codes 
of the governance variables. Then, we codify the 
governance dimensions into binary records. Thus, 
each dimension can assume values equal to 1 or 0. 
The dimension is coded 1 if half or more of the 
individual governance variables included in it are 
coded as 1. This means that the dimension has the 
minimal acceptable governance level required. On 
the other hand, if the dimension’s code is 0, it 
indicates that dimension does not support the 
minimally acceptable governance requirements.  
The sum of the codes of all the dimensions 
determines the CGI of the firm. Given that the 
dimensions are 6, the maximum value of the CGI is 
6. With this procedure we are able to identify a CGI 
that, referring to the governance dimensions and not 
to the single governance variables, allows to 
overtake two main limits occurred in other studies. 
First, it avoids the correlation problems among the 
individual variables in testing the relation with 
frauds; second, it represents the overall level of the 
governance of a firm and not only some aspects of 
it. In sum, the higher the score of the CGI, the better 
the governance of the firm. 
We expect a negative relationship between the 
corporate governance quality, measured by the CGI, 
and the level of financial statement frauds. If the 
CGI of the firm is low, the quality of the governance 
will be low, thus the likelihood of fraud and the 
magnitude of fraud will be higher, and vice-versa. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Sample and Data 
 
To test the hypothesis, a longitudinal analysis, 
covering a 14 years period from 1992 to 2005, has 
been conducted on a sample of 202 listed firms. Of 
these, 101 represent the ‘fraud firms’ because each 
of these companies faced an occurrence of financial 
statement fraud during the considered time period. 
Each of these fraud firms is matched with a no-fraud 
firm, creating a choice-based sample of 101 fraud 
and 101 no-fraud firms. The time of the analysis 
stops voluntary at the year 2005 to avoid to consider 
the period in which the worldwide financial crisis 
occurred. In fact, crises usually distort situations 
and could affect the results hiding or lowering 
impact of the factors that in normal condition can 
actually act as fraud deterrent or fraud incentives.  
Fraud Firms. The fraud firm sample includes 
financial statement fraud cases, occurred, during the 
period of analysis, in US, France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Russia, Ireland, and Sweden. 
Following the definition of the theoretical 
construct, financial statement frauds can occur 
through different implementation practices (Rezaee, 
2002)1. In our paper, we followed the approach by 
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) to 
identify the techniques through which a financial 
statement fraud occurs (Table 5)2. 
 
Table 5. Fraud techniques 
 
Technique Description 
Improper revenue 
recognition 
creation of fictitious revenue 
transactions, such as premature revenue 
recognition, improper cut-off sales, 
unauthorized shipments sham sales; 
Overstatement of 
assets 
capitalization of expenses as assets, 
usage of higher market value to increase 
the value of the asset. Accounts 
receivables, inventories, property plant 
and equipment, cash and patents are the 
asset accounts most common to be 
misstated; 
Understatement 
of Expenses/ 
Liabilities 
underestimation of pension liabilities, 
insufficient allowance of bad debt 
expenses, inadequate loss loan reserve, 
not adjusting in securities for decrease in 
the market value, failing in accrue 
warranties or commission liability, 
improper deferral of expenses; 
Misappropriation 
of assets 
registration of fictitious assets or asset 
not owned; 
Inappropriate 
disclosure 
it occurs whenever there is not a 
financial statement line item effect due 
to improper or omitted disclosure on the 
items or on the related-party 
transactions, changes in  less transparent 
accounting principles; 
Other 
miscellaneous 
techniques 
they can impact on equity account 
records, related-party transactions and 
misclassification of gains. 
 
                                                          
1 Examples of financial statement frauds are falsification, alteration or 
manipulation of financial documents and records, intentional omission or 
misrepresentations of events or transactions or any other information relevant 
for the financial statement, deliberate misapplication of accounting principles, 
policies or procedures, inadequate disclosures concerning accounting 
principles of accounting records or amounts. 
2 The manipulation can occur by an accounting record, without any effect on 
cash flows or on the real dimension of the firm, or by real, involving a change 
in the firm’s level of investment or operating activities, both with an intention 
to impact the reported results (Lev, 2003). 
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As far as the US fraud firms are concerned, the 
data are taken from the database of fraud firms 
provided by the Authors of the ‘Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting: 1998-2007 – an analysis of US Public 
Companies’, a research commissioned by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO)3. This study analyses 
instances of fraudulent financial reporting, alleged 
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs)4. Our study is aligned with the COSO 
research, considering that both exclude the 
restatements of financial statement due to errors or 
earning management activities that do not result in a 
violation of the antifraud rules. Indeed, these cannot 
be considered examples of fraudulent financial 
reporting cases.  
As far as the non-US firms are concerned, 
official databases on fraud occurrence and 
information publicly available do not exist. Thus, we 
took the information available on the ‘Loss and 
Litigation Report’ of November 2005, published by 
GenRe. This report examines the press articles on 
detected financial statement frauds and it 
summarizes the main information about the type of 
fraud, specifying also the amount deceived through 
the fraudulent behaviour5. Additional information on 
fraud data have been taken from the Stock 
Exchanges and also from the National Authorities in 
charge of the detection and the sanction of frauds6.  
For each firm involved in a fraud, the 
overstatement/understatement, as documented by 
the SEC (in the AAERs) or, as reported in the 
available public documents of the company, has 
been considered to esteem the magnitude of the 
fraud. 
For the US companies included in the sample, 
corporate governance data were taken from the 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) database, 
from the Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT database 
and from the single public corporate governance 
reports of the firms. For all the other companies of 
the sample, the governance data were taken from 
the Osiris database and from the Bloomberg website, 
or hand collected from each specific National 
Authority for the Stock Exchange Market. Where 
those data were not provided or insufficient for our 
analysis, the individual company documents and 
reports were analysed to complete the fulfilment of 
the data by hand collection. 
Concerning the financial data, the 
DATASTREAM database was used to collect 
                                                          
3 COSO sponsored the mentioned study to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission between January 1998 and December 
2007. This study updates the previous report still commissioned by the 
COSO, concerning the US financial statement fraud occurred between 1987 
and 1997. 
4 In details, to develop the database, the Data Collection Team read each 
single AAERs issued by the SEC between January 1998 and December 2007. 
The focus is on AAERs that involve an alleged violation of the Rule 10(b) of 
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 
given that these two rules represent the primary antifraud provisions related to 
financial reporting for US public companies. For the instances of fraudulent 
financial reporting, the related fraudulently misstated reports were issued 
between 1990 and 2006. 
5 The information provided by this report concern the company, the country 
where it operates, the subject(s) who detected the fraud, the date of the 
detection, the kind of fraud, and sometimes the deceived amount. The report 
is available at the website: http://www.genre.com/sharedfile/pdf/LLR_DO_E
U3-en.pdf 
6 For instance, concerning the Italian context, the information came from the 
CONSOB Authority; for France from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF); and for Germany from the documents published by the Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), the German authority for stock 
exchange markets. 
information for all the firms included in the sample 
of our analysis.  
Some worldly wisdoms have been taken during 
the data collection and firm selection processes: 
1. All data have been selected looking at the 
year preceding the one in which the fraud occurred, 
due to the fact that the data in the fraud occurrence 
year could have been affected by the fraud itself; 
2. State companies have been excluded from 
the sample, due to their particular features, which 
could affect the results of the work; 
3. Financial institutions, insurance firms and 
banks have been excluded from the sample, due to 
their particular businesses and the different kind of 
financial statement compared to the ones of the 
companies belonging to all the other types of 
industries. 
The starting sample of fraud companies was 
composed by 347 fraud firms taken by the COSO 
research database, described in 1,335 individual 
AAERs, and other 43 fraud firms found through the 
process previously described. Then, we took only 
those firms for which the amount of the fraud was 
specified. We excluded financial institutions, 
insurance firms and banks and, finally, we dropped 
the firms with not enough corporate governance and 
financial data, obtaining a final sample of 101 fraud 
firms, belonging to eleven different countries, 
accused of financial statement fraud in the period of 
time between 1992 and 2005. 
No-fraud Firms. Following the indications given 
by the literature (Beasley, 1996; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, and Lapides, 2000; Agraval and Chada, 
2005), each fraud firm needs to be matched with a 
non-fraud firm. For the choice of the non-fraud 
firms, criteria of similarity with the fraud firms have 
been adopted: (a) industry: the non-fraud firm is 
selected if its four-digit SIC code is the same of the 
fraud firm. If no four-digit SIC code match is 
available, we consider the three-digit SIC code. If 
even the three-digit SIC code is not possible to 
match, we look at the two-digit SIC code7; (b) size: 
the non-fraud firm is selected looking at the size 
measured by the Total Asset (TA) or the amount of 
Sales (SALES) or the Market Value of the firm given 
by the market capitalization (MKT CAP). A firm is 
considered as a matched firm if at least two of the 
three parameters are within +/- 30% of the value of 
the same parameters of the fraud company in the 
year before the fraud occurrence; (c) time: a non-
fraud firm is considerable as a match of a fraud firm 
only if it exists at the year preceding the fraud 
occurrence, committed by its matched fraud firm; 
(d) country: the non-fraud firm is selected among 
companies belonging to the same country of the 
fraud firm.  
The matching firms were coupled with the 
fraud firms for the described parameters in the year 
preceding the first known misstated financial 
statement, in order to have comparable data, not 
affected by the fraud occurrence (‘last clean financial 
statement’). 
For the US matching firms, all the data were 
taken from Compustat and ExecuComp databases, 
considering only the firms not subject to AAERs at 
any time during the sample period. 
                                                          
7 23 of the 101 fraud firms were matched with no-fraud firms within the same 
two-digit SIC code. 
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Finally, concerning the non-US companies, no-
fraud firms’ data were taken from Datastream 
database.  
 
3.2. The Dependent Variable 
 
The financial statement fraud (FRAUD), shortly 
‘fraud’, represents the intentional material 
misstatement of financial statements or financial 
disclosures or the perpetration of an illegal act that 
has a material direct effect on the financial 
statements or financial disclosures8.  
Prior studies used to consider the dependent 
variable fraud as a dichotomous variable, equal to 1 
when the fraud occurred, 0 otherwise (Beasley, 1996; 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006). In our 
analysis, we consider also the magnitude of the 
fraud, due to the fact that larger frauds have a 
greater negative impact on the market and cause 
higher damages to their ‘victims’. The dimensional 
aspect of the variable FRAUD allows us to measure 
the impact of corporate governance at different 
levels of the fraud, and highlights the governance 
mechanisms that affect most the largest frauds. The 
level of the fraud (LEVEL) is calculated as the ratio 
between the amount deceived through the fraud and 
the total assets of the firm9. This standardization 
procedure allows to scale the values of the variables 
by firm’s dimension, making the data comparable10. 
Four ranges of fraud representing four levels of 
fraud occurrence are created (No fraud, Low, 
Medium and High fraud). In order to express the 
fraud through a quantitative ordinal variable, the 
four ranges are expressed on a scale of numbers and 
each firm belongs to one of the fraud ranges, 
depending on the fraud level committed. In sum, the 
dependent variable FRAUD is equal to 0, 1, 2 or 3 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Fraud firms - level of fraud 
 
No Fraud 
(Range = 0) 
firms which did not commit any fraud 
(matched sample) 
101 
Low Level of 
Fraud 
(Range = 1) 
firms with a LEVEL between 0 (non 
included) and 5% included. The limit of 
5% was chosen according to the article 
2621 of Italian Civil Code 
23 
Medium Level 
of Fraud 
(Range = 2) 
firms with a LEVEL between 5 (non 
included) and 30% included. The limit 
of 30% is arbitrary due to the fact that 
there are no existing studies on this 
topic 
41 
High Level of 
Fraud 
(Range = 3) 
firms with a LEVEL higher than 30% 37 
 
3.3. Control Variables 
 
Consistently with previous studies (e.g.: Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Chen, Firth, Gao, and 
Rui, 2006), the ownership structure is considered 
through a dummy variable (BLOCK), which identifies 
the presence or not of a blockholder in the firm. 
                                                          
8 The term “financial statement fraud” was distinguished from other causes of 
materially misleading financial statements, such as unintentional errors and 
other corporate improprieties that do not necessarily cause material 
inaccuracies in financial statements. Also restatements due to errors or 
earning management activities are not included, considering they do not 
represent any violation to the antifraud securities provisions. 
9 When the fraud was not isolated to a single fiscal year, its total amount has 
been considered. 
10 We have also scaled our dependent variable by Total Revenues; main 
results were not affected. 
Thus, the variable is coded as 1 if the blockholder 
exists, otherwise the variable is coded as 0. The 
BLOCK control variables can be considered as a 
proxy of the type of corporate governance system to 
which the firm belongs: the insider system, typical 
of non-Anglo-American countries, always implies the 
existence of a blockholder, while the outsider 
system, typical of Anglo-American countries, does 
not. Aligned with previous studies (e.g. Bethel and 
Liebeskind, 1993), a ‘Blockholder’ is identified when 
a single shareholder, or a cohesive group of 
shareholders, owns a percentage of outstanding 
shares with voting rights higher than 5%. 
The variable MNGT OWN is a continuous 
variable that expresses the percentage of ownership 
held by the management or by the directors who 
serve the Board. According to previous literature 
(Beasley, 1996), this variable controls for the 
differences in the kind of blockholders holding the 
majority of the company. In fact, if management 
directors hold the ownership, the likelihood of 
affecting who is chosen to serve on the Board and of 
influencing who is monitoring the Board itself will 
be greater. In the past, scholars found support for 
the idea that the more shares were held by the 
management, the stronger the incentive to work 
fairly in order to enhance the value of the firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Later, some other 
authors found the opposite evidence, studying this 
phenomenon: the more shares were detained by the 
management, the higher the likelihood of fraud 
occurrence (Loebbecke, Eming, and Willingham, 1989). 
Moreover, variables strictly linked to the firm’s 
governance and to frauds have been included, as 
shown in Table 7. 
 
3.4. Research Design 
 
To test the hypothesis of research, a multinomial 
logistic regression on a cross-sectional analysis has 
been used11. This model represents the optimal 
choice for our analysis due to the fact that the 
dependent variable, FRAUD, is a categorically 
distributed variable, where at each value (0, 1, 2, 3) 
corresponds a range of value of fraud, increasing in 
percentage (no fraud, low fraud, medium fraud, high 
fraud). Indeed, the multinomial logistic regression is 
a type of regression analysis usually used to 
understand how a change in the dependent variable 
affects the jump from one step to the other. The 
results of this analysis put in relation the base 
outcome, which for our study is the level 0 of 
FRAUD (the fraud did not take place), with each one 
of the other levels of the variable (1, 2 and 3). As 
follows, it is possible to determine which are the 
independent variables that impact on the likelihood 
of committing the fraud (analysis of the results 
between the base outcome and the outcome of the 
FRAUD equal to level 1), and also the independent 
variables that affect the level of the fraud (analysis 
of the results between the base outcome and the 
outcomes of the FRAUD equal to level 2 and 3). 
As already mentioned, the analysis is based on 
a choice-based sample, composed by 50% of firms 
reporting a fraud occurrence and 50% of firms with 
no fraud occurrence. Considering that there is no 
                                                          
11 This regression model generalizes logistic regression by allowing more than 
two discrete outcomes. It is used to predict the probabilities of the different 
possible outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent variable, given a 
set of independent variables (which may be real-valued, binary-valued, 
categorically-valued, etc.). 
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information on the exact number of listed firms 
committing frauds within the total population of 
listed companies, the one-to-one matching process 
used in our research differs from a pure random 
sampling approach. 
 
Table 7. Regression variables 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
FRAUD  
Financial 
Statement Fraud 
The percentage of the fraud is expressed through the ratio between the 
amount deceived with the fraud and the total asset of the firm. Count 
variable: 
- No Fraud (0): all the firms of the matched sample which didn’t commit any 
fraud are coded as 0; 
- Low Level of fraud (1): firms with a  LEVEL between 0 and 5% included;  
- Medium Level of fraud (2) firms with a  LEVEL between 5 and 30% included; 
- High Level of fraud (3), firms with a  LEVEL higher than 30% 
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE     
CGI 
Corporate 
Governance Index 
Index which expresses how good is the corporate governance level of the 
firm. It goes from 0 (bad governance) to 7 (good governance) 
  
CONTROL VARIABLES     
BLOCK 
Blockholder CG 
Model 
A blockholder is defined as the cumulative percentage of outstanding 
common shares held by a single individual or a cohesive group holding at 
least 5% of the outstanding stocks. The variable is a dummy variable coded 
as 1 if the Blockholder exists, 0 otherwise 
SAM 
MGMTOWN 
Ownership held 
by directors 
The cumulative percentage of ownership held by managers or directors who 
serve on the board 
SAM 
BODSIZE Board Dimension The number of Board members Datastream 
BODIND 
Board 
Independence 
Percentage of Board members who are not officers of the firm (ratio between 
the number of independent members and the total number of Board 
members 
  
BODMEET Board Meetings Number of Board meeting in a year   
BODAGE 
Age of BoD 
Members 
Average age of Board members   
CHAIRTENURE Chairman Tenure Number of years that the Chairman has served as Chairman   
BUSYDIR Busy Directors 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if a director serves also in other Boards, 0 if the 
director serves only in the Board of the company 
  
ETHIC Ethic Code Dummy variable coded as 1 if the company has a Code of Ethic, 0 otherwise   
AUDIND 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the majority of the committee is composed by 
independent directors, 0 otherwise 
  
NOMIND 
Nomination 
Committee 
Independence 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the majority of the committee is composed by 
independent directors, 0 otherwise 
  
COMPIND 
Compensation 
Committee 
Independence 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the majority of the committee is composed by 
independent directors, 0 otherwise 
  
AUDFINEXP 
Audit Committee 
Financial Expert 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if there is a financial expert (CPA, CFA or a 
person with corporate financial management experience) in the audit 
committee; 0 otherwise  
  
CEODUAL CEO Duality Dummy variable equal to 1 in presence of the CEO duality; 0 otherwise   
CEOTENURE CEO Tenure Number of year that the CEO served as CEO   
CEOSO CEO Stock Option 
Ratio between the amount of the value of the total stock option granted and 
the total annual compensation the CEO received 
  
LEVCOMP 
CEO 
Compensation 
Leverage 
Ratio between the variable compensation (Stock Option, Bonuses and 
Others) and the annual salary the CEO received 
  
BIG5 External Auditor 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the auditor is one of the big five 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst&Young, Deloitte&Touche and Arthur 
Andersen); 0 otherwise 
  
NONAUDITTOTALE 
External Auditor 
Fees 
Percentage of the non-audit fees paid to the auditors. Variable given by the 
ratio between non-audit fees paid and total fees paid to the external auditor 
  
FINLEV 
Financial 
Leverage 
Ratio between the long term debt, as a proxy of the financial debts, and the 
common equity of the firm (Long Term Debt / Equity) * 100 
Datastream 
SALES Sales Represents the sum of Total Revenues of the firm  Datastream 
GROWTH Growth Sales growth rate, given by  (Sales t-1 - Sales t-2) / Sales t-2   
RESTAT Restatement 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a restatement occurred the year before the 
fraud; 0 otherwise 
  
ROE Profitability Return on Equity, given by the ratio between the Net Income and the Equity.   
TIME 
Corporate 
Governance 
Reforms 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the fraud company (and thus its matched 
company) committed the fraud before corporate governance reforms 
applied after financial scandals  
  
COUNTRY1 Country 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the company is from Italy, France, Germany or 
Switzerland 
  
COUNTRY2 Country 
Dummy variable coded as 1 if the company is from Sweden, Russia, 
Netherlands, Ireland or Belgium 
  
IND  Industry Identified by the two-digit SIC code   
The model captures the effect of the corporate 
governance on the likelihood of the fraud 
occurrence and on the level of the fraud itself, 
controlling for other variables and comparing the 
fraud firms with the no-fraud firms, through the 
presence of the matching sample. In this way, we can 
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control for the no-fraud firms and the fraud firms at 
the same time, not affecting the results concerning 
the factors that contributed to generate the fraud.  
The multinomial logistic regression model on a 
cross-sectional analysis presents the following 
equation (1): 
 
FRAUDt = α + ß1CGIt-1 + ß2BLOCKt-1 + ß3MNGT 
OWNt-1 + ß4RESTATt-1 + ß5ROEt-1 + ß6FIN LEVt-1 + 
ß7SALESt-1 + ß8GROWTHt-1 + ß9TIMEt-1 + 
ß10COUNTRY1t-1 + ß11COUNTRY2t-1 + εit    
(1) 
 
All the independent variables are measured in 
the year before the year of the fraud occurrence in 
order to have reliable data not affected by the fraud 
situation. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
After running the multinomial logistic regression, 
the independence assumption is verified applying 
the Hausman’s specification test12. The test gives 
positive results on the independence, thus the 
subsets of choice alternatives are independent from 
each other and the multinomial logistic regression 
model is reliable. The multinomial logistic 
regression with the robustness of the standard 
errors (robust option) is used to obtain robust 
standard errors for the parameters’ estimates, which 
mitigate the effect of an eventual slight over-
dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The model 
is statistically significant (p-value for the chi-squared 
equals to .0000). The Wald chi-square statistic is 
equal to 95.40. 
We do not consider the value of the Pseudo R2 
(0.2038) which is the McFadden’s Pseudo R2, due to 
the fact that this statistic differs from the Square R2 
of the OLS (the proportion of variance of the 
response variable explained by the predictors). The 
logistic regressions do not have an equivalent of the 
OLS R2 and all the other alternatives of R2 are 
considered as mere indicators, but the Stata manual 
itself recommends interpreting this statistic with 
caution. Considering the peculiarity of the applied 
model, we discuss the results dividing them into 3 
different levels of fraud. 
 
4.1. CGI and Low Level Fraud 
 
Starting from the results relative to the case of low 
level of fraud (see Table 8) in relation with the base 
outcome (FRAUD=0), we find that, consistent with 
the predictions related to the hypothesis, the 
corporate governance as a system of mechanisms 
(CGI) shows a significant and negative relation with 
the level of the fraud (β = -.57, P>|Z| = .030). In other 
terms, the better the quality of the governance of the 
firm, the lower the likelihood to have a fraud 
occurrence and also the magnitude of the fraud. 
Thus, the hypothesis is verified in case of low level 
of fraud (less than 5%). 
 
                                                          
12 The multinomial logistic regression has an assumption behind its model. It 
assumes that data are case specific. In other words, each independent variable 
has a single value for each case. This assumption is called Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which from a statistic point of view means that 
the odds ratios are independent of the other alternatives. This independence 
assumption can be tested with the Hausman’s specification test. In practice, it 
means that if a subset of choice alternatives is irrelevant, it can be omitted 
from the sample without changing the remaining parameters systematically 
(Stata website – www.stata.com). If this assumption is not verified, a nested 
logit or multinomial probit model should be applied. 
Table 8. Regression results (low level of fraud) 
 
Multinomial logistic regession 
Number of obs = 202 
Wald chi2(33) = 95.40 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -197.59872 Pseudo R2 = 0.2038 
1 - Low level of fraud (FRAUD = 1) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P|z| 
CGI -.5729328* .2651881 -2.160477 .0307358 
BLOCK 1.997786** .6394511 3.12422 .0017828 
MGMTOWN -3.367391+ 1.721964 -1.955552 .0505179 
RESTAT .7923151 .6829476 1.16014 .2459917 
ROE -.008397 .0119548 -.7023951 .4824328 
FINLEV .2140207+ .1109925 1.928245 .0538247 
SALES -1.33e-09 1.62e-09 -.8250204 .40936 
GROWTH .2533063* .1246731 2.031764 .0421776 
TIME 1.285423 1.119239 1.148479 .2507709 
COUNTRY1 -.8576279 1.332407 -.6436679 .5197908 
COUNTRY2 .4944426 .6859136 .7208527 .4710002 
Constant .1258644 1.200344 .104857 .9164893 
FRAUD = 0 is the base outcome 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
The variable BLOCK shows a significant and 
positive relation with the level of the fraud (β = 1.99, 
P>|Z| = .001). Thus, the results suggest that the 
presence of an insider corporate governance system 
increases both the likelihood of the fraud occurrence 
and the amount of the fraud deceived. Thus, we can 
state that conflicts among majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders seem to lead more easily 
to fraudulent behaviour, at least in case of low level 
of fraud. 
The variable MNGT OWN is significant and 
negatively related with the dependent variable 
(β = - 3.36, P>|Z| = .050), confirming the findings of 
some previous studies (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Our results suggest that the 
presence of ownership detained by directors can be 
a factor which reduces the likelihood of fraud 
occurrence and magnitude, being the directors more 
motivated to control the top management and the 
CEO. 
The control variable measuring the financial 
leverage of the company (FIN LEV) is positively 
related with the fraud (β = .21) and significant at a 
10% significance level (P>|Z| = .053). This is coherent 
with previous studies which demonstrate that the 
level of long term debt, detained by the company, 
might be a factor positively related with the fraud 
occurrence, exercising a great pressure on the 
management decisions and actions, and considering 
that financially distressed firms can be more 
induced to commit fraud (Erickson et al., 2006). 
The growth rate of the firm (GROWTH) results 
significant and it is positively related to the fraud 
(β = .25, P>|Z| = .042), too. This result is aligned with 
the studies of Loebbecke, Eming, and Willingham 
(1989), Bell and Carcello (2000), Beasley (1996), and 
Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), where it is 
shown that a rapid growth can induce to misstate 
the financial statement during a turndown to 
continue to meet analysts’ forecasts. 
The coefficients of the control variables 
RESTAT, ROE, SALES, TIME, COUNTRY1 and 
COUNTRY2 do not appear significantly related to the 
dependent variable, thus it seems to suggest that 
these factors do not affect the level of the likelihood 
of the fraud when the level of the fraud is low. 
In order to investigate on possible relations 
between the fraud occurrence and the sectors of 
activity, we checked for the Industry, but the results 
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did not differ significantly from the ones presented. 
Considering that the model already has many 
variables, the only effect was a reduction of the 
statistically significance of the model, and the 
variable Industry was not significant at all. 
Specifically, 27 dummy variables have been created, 
considering that the sample includes firms operating 
in 28 different sectors, based on the two-digit SIC 
codes. After that, we checked again for the Industry, 
considering only 7 dummy variables, relying on 8 
different industries based on one-digit SIC codes, 
but no different results were achieved. 
 
4.2. CGI and Medium Level Fraud 
 
Concerning the results connected to the case of 
medium level of fraud (see Table 9) in relation still 
with the base outcome (FRAUD=0), we find that the 
corporate governance as a whole system (CGI) has 
even in this case a significant and negative relation 
with the level of the fraud (β = -.63, P>|Z| = .003), 
verifying the hypothesis once again. Thus, we can 
affirm that having a ‘good’ quality of corporate 
governance, determined by the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the different governance aspects of the 
firm, reduces the possibility to have a fraud 
occurrence and also its amount. Corporate 
governance acts as a fraud deterrent.  
The empirical analysis confirms also some of 
the previous considerations: a significant and 
positive relation between the Blockholder presence 
(BLOCK) and the level of the fraud (β = 1.54, 
P>|Z| = .001) comes up; a significant and negative 
relation between the percentage of ownership held 
by management and directors and the level of the 
fraud (β = -.58, P>|Z| = .029) exists; and finally the 
control variable FIN LEV is significantly and 
positively related with the fraud (β = .021, 
P>|Z| =.008), as in the case of low level of fraud. 
 
Table 9. Regression results (medium level of fraud) 
 
Multinomial logistic regession 
Number of obs =202 
Wald chi2(33)= 95.40 
Prob > chi2=0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood =-197.59872 Pseudo R2=0.2038 
2 - Medium level of fraud (FRAUD = 2) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P|z| 
CGI -.6308642** .2152544 -2.930783 .0033811 
BLOCK 1.542729** .4760917 3.240404 .0011936 
MGMTOWN -.5830379* .2677376 -2.177647 .0294323 
RESTAT .563751 .7024532 .802546 .4222372 
ROE -.0301793** .0111676 -2.702413 .0068838 
FINLEV .0214917** .0081156 2.648204 .0080921 
SALES -6.20e-10 9.07e-10 -.6829572 .4946339 
GROWTH .1132064 .1187748 .9531178 .3405304 
TIME -.1397448 .7712317 -.1811969 .856213 
COUNTRY1 -2.458871*** .7149976 -3.438993 .0005839 
COUNTRY2 -1.414112+ .8508324 -1.662034 .096506 
Constant 1.934824* .9560274 2.023816 .0429891 
FRAUD = 0 is the base outcome 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Moreover, the control variable measuring the 
profitability of the company (ROE) is significant and 
it is negatively related with the fraud (β = -.030, 
P>|Z| = .006), coherently with previous studies (Bell 
and Carcello, 2000; Rosner, 2003), suggesting that 
companies with higher profitability do have less 
incentives to manipulate financial statements and to 
deceive considerable amounts.  
The variable COUNTRY1 is significantly and 
negatively related with the dependent variable (β 
=  2.45, P>|Z| =.000). Keeping in mind that the 
variable COUNTRY1 (as the variable COUNTRY2) is a 
non-ordinal categorical variable built in relation with 
the US and UK countries as baseline, the fact that 
this variable is negatively related with the FRAUD 
means that belonging to one of the countries 
included in the variable COUNTRY1 (Italy, France, 
Germany or Switzerland) has a negative impact on 
the FRAUD variable higher than the one that US and 
UK companies have on the FRAUD. The reason of 
this evidence could be found in the cultural, 
historical, and institutional differences, which 
characterize these countries.  
The coefficients of the control variables 
RESTAT, SALES, GROWTH, TIME and COUNTRY2 do 
not appear significant, thus it seems to suggest that 
these factors do not affect the level of the occurred 
fraud in case of medium level of fraud. 
Even for the medium level of fraud, the output 
of the regression connected to the 27 dummy 
variables Industry produced no significant results 
and the only effect was a reduction of the 
statistically significance of the model. 
 
4.3 CGI and High Level Fraud 
 
Finally, in case of high level of fraud (see Table 10) 
in relation with the base outcome (FRAUD=0), we 
find that the CGI variable has a significant and 
negative relation with the level of the fraud (β = -.82, 
P>|Z| = .000), verifying once again the hypothesis. 
Thus, we can affirm that the corporate governance 
acts as a fraud deterrent for any level of financial 
statement fraud. 
 
Table 10. Regression results (high level of fraud) 
 
Multinomial logistic regession 
Number of obs =202 
Wald chi2(33)= 95.40 
Prob > chi2=0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood =-197.59872 Pseudo R2=0.2038 
3 - Medium level of fraud (FRAUD = 3) 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P|z| 
CGI -.8200564*** 0.2286174 -3.587.025 0.000335 
BLOCK 1.526884** 0.4792357 3.186.081 0.001442 
MGMTOWN -.5618973** 0.2109933 -2.663.105 0.007742 
RESTAT .7137583 0.571748 1.248.379 0.211892 
ROE -.0031187 0.0103325 -0.301833 0.762779 
FINLEV .0802076 0.0664023 1.207.903 0.227085 
SALES -1.05e-09 7.23E-10 -1.449.288 0.147257 
GROWTH .2234862+ 0.123291 1.812.672 0.069882 
TIME -.8849796 0.7644653 -1.157.645 0.247009 
COUNTRY1 -.375508 0.7805261 -0.481096 0.630448 
COUNTRY2 -.4133592 0.579607 -0.713172 0.47574 
Constant 1.956557* 0.9600836 2.037.903 0.04156 
FRAUD = 0 is the base outcome 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
In line with the two previous results of the 
regression, even in case of high level of fraud, the 
variable BLOCK and MNGT OWN are significantly 
related with the dependent variable, respectively 
positively related (β = 1.52, P>|Z| = .001), and 
negatively related (β = - .56, P>|Z| = .007). 
The growth rate of the firm (GROWTH) is also 
positively related to the fraud (β = .22) and 
significant at a 10% significance level (P>|Z| =.069), in 
line once again with the results of Loebbecke, Eming, 
and Willingham (1989), Bell and Carcello (2000), 
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Beasley (1996), and Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2006). This outcome suggests that the higher the 
growth experienced by the company in the past 
years, the higher the incentive for the management 
to commit a fraud, deceiving great amounts of 
resources, in order to accomplish the market’s 
expectations of a continuing growth also in case it 
doesn’t last anymore. 
The coefficients of the control variables 
RESTAT, ROE, FIN LEV, SALES, TIME, COUNTRY1, and 
COUNTRY2 do not appear significant. Thus, it seems 
to suggest that these factors do not affect the level 
and the likelihood of the fraud when the level of the 
fraud is high. 
Even for high level of fraud, the output of the 
regression connected to the 27 dummy variables 
Industry produced no significant results and the 
only registered effect was a reduction of the 
statistically significance of the model. 
In each case of level of fraud, the results 
demonstrate that a ‘good’ quality of corporate 
governance reduces the likelihood of fraud 
occurrence and its magnitude. Thus, the hypothesis 
is verified at all levels of fraud. The control variables 
help in the analysis of the features that act as 
enhancing factors or reducing factors of the fraud 
occurrence and magnitude. In all the three cases, the 
presence of a Blockholder increases the likelihood of 
fraud occurrence and its magnitude. Contrarily, the 
percentage of shares owned by the directors acts as 
a reducing factor on the dependent variable, 
confirming the previous results achieved by the 
literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The results suggest that the pressure of the 
market in terms of growth expectations impacts 
mostly on the firms’ behaviour in cases of low and 
high level of fraud. This is consistent with the 
suggestions of Kulikova and Satdarova (2016), who 
state that firms tend to show results in the best light 
in order to attract investors, financing their growth. 
The level of debt seems to affect mostly the firms’ 
behaviour in case of low and medium voluntary 
misstatements, while for high level of fraud it does 
not appear a relevant indicator. Similarly, the 
profitability of the company acts as a deterrent to 
commit fraud in case of medium level of fraud, but 
not in the other two cases. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
5.1. Conclusions 
 
The problems generated by frauds mainly rely on 
the absence of trust of the investors towards the 
market, generated by the lack of quality and fairness 
in the financial information provided by the firms, 
making the market less efficient. Cases of fraudulent 
financial reporting impact on the credibility of the 
market, on the financial statement process, and pose 
questions on the role of management, auditors, 
regulators and analysts in it. This fact leads to a 
major problem in the market: if investors start 
dismissing the confidence of the market itself, all 
the firms, and consequently the whole economy, will 
suffer because the market represents the main 
supplier of capital for firms.  
It is not possible to define the exact cost of 
financial fraud, mainly for two reasons: first, only a 
few frauds are discovered, and, second, most of the 
time, companies do not reveal the fraud discover in 
order to preserve their image and reputation 
(Rezaee, 2002). Another relevant indirect cost of 
fraud relies on the change of management that 
occurs after the detection of the fraud itself. The top 
management figures, generally involved in the fraud, 
are replaced with new top management, implying 
the loss of experienced people, and the needed time 
to replace them and to prepare the management to 
get involved in the firm. To have an idea of the 
damages caused by frauds, we can take into account 
the information provided by Glass Lewis & Co. 
(2005), who evidence that the lost market 
capitalization of 30 major fraud scandals between 
1997 and 2004 was around $900 billion, meaning a 
loss of 77% of the market value of these firms. 
Reflecting on this data, it appears more than 
significant to continue to investigate on this 
phenomenon, its causes and the possible solutions 
to bundle it. 
Taking into account the three conditions of the 
“fraud triangle” (Cressey, 1953), one of them focuses 
on the incentives. We can easily point out, looking at 
previous literature and at our results, that even 
nowadays the incentive to commit fraud can arise 
due to the pressure to meet analysists forecasts, the 
need for external financing or even a poor 
performance. In fact, aligned with Chen, Cumming, 
Hou, and Lee (2016), on one hand we can think that 
the market acts as a monitoring actor, moderating 
agency problems, but on the other hand, the market 
can generate pressure to achieve short-term 
performance targets, exacerbating agency problems. 
This incentive will be worsened in case the second 
condition of the fraud triangle, opportunity, occurs 
at the same time. This factor is associated with the 
situations that enable fraud to be carried out 
without the risk of getting caught (Murphy and 
Dacin, 2011). Thus, a weak corporate governance, 
implying low or ineffective controls, generates 
optimal conditions for managers to commit frauds. 
Indeed, after the most relevant financial crises (such 
as the Asian one of 1997-1998, the actual crisis 
started in 2007 and still continuing that has affected 
almost all countries in the world, and, in addition to 
those, the speculative bubble of 2000 which led 
many companies to bankruptcy), academics and 
practitioners have started to question the role of the 
corporate governance in the firm. From the empirical 
findings we highlight that the corporate governance 
as a whole system has a role at reducing the fraud 
occurrence and magnitude. These results are also 
aligned to the recent findings provided by Soltani 
(2014), who, analyzing six major corporate scandals, 
demonstrates that among the most relevant causes 
of the fraud occurrence there were ineffective 
boards, inefficient corporate governance 
mechanisms and internal controls, failure of 
external auditors, dominant CEOs, and managers’ 
greed and a desire for power. Nevertheless, some 
academics and practitioners, after the major 
scandals were doubting if a ‘good’ quality of 
corporate governance could impact positively at 
reducing the damages produced by the contingency 
situation. On the crest of the emotions generated by 
the recent crisis situation, some authors (Erkens, 
Hung, and Matos, 2012) accused and pointed a 
finger towards the corporate governance of the 
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firms, sustaining that even ‘good’ corporate 
governance structures did not produce any effect 
and did not lead the companies to perform or 
behave better. To support their ideas, these Authors 
present some significant examples, such as the 
Lehman Brothers’ one that, despite its commonly 
recognized good corporate governance structure, 
experienced one of the most relevant bankruptcies 
of the last decades. Despite the empirical evidences, 
nowadays it seems reasonable to affirm that only 
with a good quality of corporate governance the 
conflict of interests among the different actors of 
the firms can be reduced, assuring fairness and 
control of the management.  
The results of this work, innovative in relation 
to the measurement both of the fraud – not only the 
occurrence is taken into account but also the 
magnitude – and the corporate governance, with the 
construct of a new index measuring the quality of 
the governance system of the firm, suggest that the 
governance of the firm acts as a fraud deterrent for 
any amount of financial statement fraud. In other 
words, a ‘good’ governance is needed to monitor 
over the management behaviors. These 
considerations seem to be even more valid for those 
firms characterized by the presence of a 
blockholder, most common in countries where the 
insider system of governance is predominant. These 
evidences are aligned also with the idea of the two-
tier structure of the compliance-control (Kulikova 
and Satdarova, 2016): the internal compliance-
control has to be assured by internal corporate rules 
and regulations. Moreover, the internal compliance-
control is accompanied by the external compliance-
control, implemented by governments and 
authorities through mandatory and recommended 
rules and procedures. Thus, we can conclude that 
governments should act as a reinforcement of 
internal corporate governance rules and practices 
aiming to bundle the discretionary behaviors that 
could lead to a fraud occurrence. 
 
5.2. Limitations and Further Research  
 
The analysis we conducted can be considered a first 
step for literature that investigates the role of 
corporate governance as a whole system of 
mechanisms on financial statement fraud, because 
as previously said, to our knowledge, no preceding 
studies tested this relation. Notwithstanding, even if 
the work presents some significant suggestions for 
the improvement of the analysis on the fraud 
occurrence and prevention, some limitations can be 
traced as a starting point of further researches. A 
first limit of this work relies on the fact that we did 
not consider the type of Blockholder. In other words, 
we did not investigate on the nature of the majority 
owners of the company (management, institutions, 
pension funds, etc.).  
A second limit is connected to the variety of 
the sample adopted, concerning the nationalities of 
the firms. In fact, the sample included companies 
belonging to 11 selected countries. This implies that 
11 different cultural and institutional contexts have 
been simultaneously analyzed. The choice of these 
countries was guided by the will of taking into 
consideration the main realities that reflect the two 
types of corporate governance systems, insider 
system and outsider system. Conscious of the 
numerous differences traceable among these 
countries, from various points of view, we controlled 
for the most relevant variables which could reflect 
these differences. Nevertheless, some aspects, such 
as the fraud detection policies and the specific 
legislation of each country, could not be monitored 
thoroughly. Thus, further researches could focus on 
single countries in order to have results referring to 
a single specific cultural and institutional context. 
On the contrary, a broader analysis, considering 
more than 11 countries could be implemented to 
have a worldwide comparison of outcomes. 
A third limit of the study relies on the fact that 
the sample on which we tested our hypothesis was 
composed by 101 fraud firms and 101 no-fraud 
matched firms, due to the difficulties in findings 
enough data on the financial statement fraud 
amounts specifically. Thus, further studies could 
conduct the analysis on a broader sample. 
Finally, we have to point out that literature 
sometimes presents different and opposite points of 
view about what can be considered as ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ governance. Thus, given that no clear rules are 
established on this topic and each personal 
judgement can be contradicted by different 
opinions, this may constitute a weak point of any 
research on the quality of the firms’ governance. 
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